

SEMIOTIK = ???

02: Ch.S. Peirce

semiotica

semiotics

sémiotique

Σημειωτική

semasiologie

sematologie

sémiologie



“all thought
is in signs”

Charles Sanders
Peirce
(1839-1914)

A small, rectangular image of a handwritten signature in cursive script, which reads "C. S. Peirce". The signature is written in dark ink on a light-colored background.

Charles S. Peirce*

Amerikanischer Philosoph des Pragmatismus, Logiker, Naturwissenschaftler (1839-1914). Sein umfangreiches Werk ist noch immer nicht vollständig publiziert. Als Hauptquelle lagen – abgesehen von wenigen Einzelpublikationen – über Jahrzehnte nur die Textfragmente in den acht Bänden der *Collected Papers* vor (Peirce 1931-58; zitiert als CP Band-Nr. Paragraph), in den sechziger Jahren folgte eine Microfilm-Ausgabe der Manuskripte (Peirce 1961-66; zitiert als MS #), seit 1982 publiziert das *Peirce Edition Project* (Indiana University) eine kritische Gesamtausgabe (Peirce 1982 ff.).

* Der Name wird wie das englische Wort „purse“ ausgesprochen, nicht wie „pierce“.

Charles S. Peirce — Publikationen

1

- Peirce, Charles S. (1931-58). *Collected Papers*. Vols. 1-6 eds. Ch. Hartshorne & Peter Weiss, vols. 7-8 ed. A.W. Burks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press [zitiert/quoted: CP Band.Paragraph/vol.paragraph, z.B. CP 5.484]
- (1963-70). *The Charles S. Peirce Papers*. 33 reels, microfilm edition. Cambridge, MA: The Houghton Library, Harvard University Library Microreproduction Service
- (1977). *Semiotics and Significs: The correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby*. Ed. C.S. Hardwick. Bloomington: Indiana University Press
- (1982 ff.). *Writings of Charles S. Peirce. A Chronological Edition*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press [bis 2000 sechs Bände; weitere in Bearb.]
- (1986-93). *Semiotische Schriften*. 3 vols. Hg. und übers. Christian J. Kloesel & Helmut Pape. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp
- (1991). *Vorlesungen über Pragmatismus*. Mit Einleitung und Anmerkungen neu hg. von Elisabeth Walther (= Philosophische Bibliothek. 435). Hamburg: Felix Meiner 1991 [1. Auflage: 1973]

Charles S. Peirce — Publikationen

2

Houser, Nathan & Christian Kloesel (eds.)(1992). *The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings*. Volume 1 (1867-1893). Bloomington: Indiana University Press [= Peirce EP 1:pp]

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Robin, R.S. (ed.)(1967). *Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce*. Amherst MA – Worchester: The University of Massachusetts Press

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1

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Merrell, Floyd (no date). "Semiotics versus Semiology: or, How Can We Get a Handle on *Semiosis*?" Web online: <<http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/floyd/semflo.htm>>; retrieved: 2007-11-20

Oehler, Klaus (1981). „Idee und Grundriß der Peirceschen Semiotik“. In: Krampen, Martin, Klaus Oehler, Roland Posner & Thure von Uexküll (Hg.) (1981). *Die Welt als Zeichen. Klassiker der modernen Semiotik*. Berlin: Severin und Siedler 1981, 15-49

Pape, Helmut (1998). "Peirce and his followers (Peirce und seine Nachfolger)". In: Posner, Roland, Klaus Robering & Thomas A. Sebeok (eds.) (1997-2004). *Semiotik. Ein Handbuch zu den zeichentheoretischen Grundlagen von Natur und Kultur / Semiotics. A Handbook on the Sign-Theoretic Foundations of Nature and Culture*. Berlin: de Gruyter, Vol. 2, 2016-2040

Publikationen über Charles S. Peirce



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Queiroz, João & Ricardo Gudwin (eds.) (no date/2001). *Digital Encyclopedia of Charles S. Peirce*. Web online: <<http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/>>; visited: 2007-11-20



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Theleffsen, Thorkild (2000/2001). "Firstness and Thirdness Displacement: Epistemology of Peirce's Sign Trichotomies". *Applied Semiotics/Sémiotique appliquée AS/SA* N° 10. Web online: <<http://www.epas.utoronto.ca/french/as-sa/ASSA-No10/No10-A2.html>>, <thirdness.gif>, <tensigntypes.gif>; retrieved 2003-05-02

Publikationen — Charles S. Peirce Cover 1



Publikationen — Charles S. Peirce Cover 2



Charles S. Peirce: Zeichen, Semiotik & andere Disziplinen a

“It has never been in my power to study anything, – mathematics, ethics, metaphysics, gravitation, thermodynamics, optics, chemistry, comparative anatomy, astronomy, psychology, phonetics, economics, the history of science, whist, men and women, wine, metrology, except as a study of semeiotic.”

(Peirce 1977: 85)

Charles S. Peirce: Zeichen, Semiotik & andere Disziplinen b

“Nothing is a sign, unless it is interpreted as a sign.”

(Peirce CP 2.308)

“A sign is a species of medium of communication. [...] How would it do to say that a sign is a consciousness of a habit, that is, that an instance of a sign is a present determination of a quasi-mind brought about by the direct action of a habit of that quasi-mind.”

(Peirce MS 339, January 30, 1906; Notebook)

“All my notions are too narrow. Instead of ‘Sign’, ought I not to say Medium?” (Peirce MS 339, 1906) .”

(Peirce MS 339)

“Should I say medium instead of ‘sign’?.”

(Peirce CP 3.221)

Charles S. Peirce: MS 318 "backwoodsman"

(Prag 58) [I here owe my patient reader a confession. It is that when I said that those signs that have a logical interpretant are either general or closely connected with generals, this was not a scientific result, but only ~~the~~ a strong impression due to a life-long study of the nature of signs. My excuse for not answering the question scientifically is that I ~~seem to be~~ am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for ~~the~~ ^a first-comer. I am, ^{accordingly} obliged to confine myself to the most important questions. ~~Of~~ ^{of} questions of the ^{same} particular type ~~as~~ ^{as} the one I answer on the basis of an

(Peirce MS 318: 58 (1907); <<http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/ms318.html>>, <ms318-a.jpg>)

Charles S. Peirce: MS 318 “backwoodsman”

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(Peirce Ms 318, CP 5.488)


(almost any kind) 1909 Oct Nov 1 361r

A "Sign" is an ens, ~~which~~ ^{or} something ~~which~~ ^{which} ~~was~~ ^{is} in addition
~~to~~ ^{possessing} characters such as ~~other~~ ^{on} ~~ens~~ ^{of the same kind} might possess
 without being a "Sign", ~~is in some way~~ ^{is in or is capable of determining}
~~causing an effect, called here an Interpretant, upon a~~
~~conscious Being, which is as if it were in some way due,~~
~~or in some mode corresponds to such as might be regarded~~
~~as affecting some~~ ^{mentally affecting some}
~~affecting some consciousness so as to tend to produce in him~~
~~a disposition, action, or imagination as if some state or thing~~
~~called the substance, signification, predicate, or (have parti-~~
~~cularly) the Interpretant of the Sign were realized were~~
~~embodied more definitely realized in reference to an object~~
 ? (other than the sign itself) or in

(Charles S. Peirce MS 339.664,663 360r,360v Nov. 1, 1909;
 <<http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/rsources/mspages/339d-664.pdf>>)

Charles S. Peirce: MS 339.664

2



A "Sign" is an ens (something, of any kind), which in addition to possessing characters such as an other ens of the same kind might possess without being a "Sign" [,] is capable of [~~causing an effect called here an Interpretant, upon a conscious being, which is as if it were in some way due, or in some mode corresponded to such as might be regarded as mentally affecting some~~ conscious] affecting some conscious Being so as to tend to produce in him a disposition, action, or imagination as if some state of things called the substance, signification, predicate, or (here particularly) the Interpretant of the Sign were more definitely realized in reference to an object (other than the sign itself) or in [...]



[Transcribed by Joseph Ransdell]

(Charles S. Peirce MS 339.664,663 360r,360v Nov. 1, 1909;

<<http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/rsources/mspages/339d-664.pdf>>

<<http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/rsources/mspages/ms339d-663f.pdf>>)

Charles S. Peirce: Graphs



<http://peirce.monmouth.edu/~bill/images/ms145/s145_23R.jpeg>
 <http://peirce.monmouth.edu/~bill/images/ms462/462_11s.jpg>

Charles S. Peirce — Thought in Signs

“If we seek the light of external facts, the only cases of thought which we can find are of thought in signs.

Plainly, no other thought can be evidenced by external facts. But we have seen that only by external facts can thought be known at all. The only thought, then, which can possibly be cognized is thought in signs. But thought which cannot be cognized does not exist. All thought, therefore, must necessarily be in signs.”

(Peirce CP 5.251)

Charles S. Peirce — Thinking

1. We have no power of introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts.
2. We have no power of intuition, but every cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions.
3. We have no power of thinking without signs.
4. We have no conception of the absolutely incognizable.

(“Questions concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man”.
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 1868/69 [CP 5.265])

Charles S. Peirce: Kategorien

1

Grundlage der Peirceschen Semiotik sind die drei Universal-kategorien aller Phänomene:

Erstheit (firstness)

als Kategorie der reinen **Qualität** oder Möglichkeit: “*Firstness* is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else”. (Peirce CP 8.328)

Zweitheit (secondness)

als Kategorie der **Relation**, Reaktion (Ursache-Wirkung): “It meets us in such facts as another, relation, compulsion, effect, dependence, independence, negation, occurrence, reality, result”. (Peirce CP 1.356-359)

Dritttheit (thirdness)

als Kategorie der Gesetzmäßigkeit, Vermittlung, **Repräsentation**, Kommunikation, Semiose: “Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other.” (Peirce CP 8.328)

Charles S. Peirce: Kategorien

2

Firstness

possibility
quality
entity

rheme

Secondness

actuality
relation
fact

proposition

Thirdness

necessity
representation
habit
rule, law
argument

Charles S. Peirce: Kategorien – Beispiele a

“In art, **Firstness** might be a two-dimensional rectangular patch of color on a Picasso canvas. **Secondness** in such case would be that patch’s interactive interrelations to other rectangular, triangular and irregular patches in the painting. **Thirdness** would be the viewer’s putting them all together into an imaginary three-dimensional image as if seen from the front, from the back, from the right side, from the left side, from above, and from below, all in simultaneity.”

(Merrell n.d., <http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/floyd/semflo.htm>)

Charles S. Peirce: Kategorien – Beispiele b

“In literature, **Firstness** is a few lines of avant garde poetry as marks on paper in terms of their “possibility” for some reading somewhere and somewhen by some poetry lover. **Secondness** is their actual reading and their interrelation with the reader’s present mindset and memories of the past and readings of many other lines of poetry. **Thirdness** is the reader’s interaction with the lines of poetry in such a manner that meaning emerges for her at that particular moment.”

(Merrell n.d., <http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/floyd/semflo.htm>)

Charles S. Peirce: Kategorien – Beispiele c

“In everyday life, **Firstness** is a double arch of bright yellowness in the distance. **Secondness** is the interrelation established by some hungry observer between the parabolically curved, elongated yellowness and a colorful building underneath it. **Thirdness** is recognition of that familiar establishment as “McDonald’s”—since language enters into the picture. Then, according to one’s culinary habits, one decides to enter the temple of cholesterol and stuff oneself or to continue searching for more aesthetically prepared nutrients.”

(Merrell n.d., <http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/floyd/semflo.htm>)

Charles S. Peirce

geht von einer triadischen Relation aus, einer „triple connection of *sign, thing signified, cognition produced in the mind*“


(Peirce CP 1.372)

Ein Zeichen oder Repräsentamen ist etwas, das für etwas anderes steht und als solches von jemandem verstanden wird.

representamen	R
object	O
interpretant	I

“A sign, or **representamen**, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the **interpretant** of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its **object**.”

(Peirce CP 2.228)



Charles S. Peirce: *semiosis*

1

Obwohl der Mensch in seinen Definitionen konstitutiv eingeführt ist – „nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign“ (Peirce CP 2.172) –, darf der *Interpretant* nicht mit der interpretierenden Person verwechselt werden, er ist vielmehr die Wirkung des Zeichens in ihrem Denken oder Fühlen. Peirce gibt hier keine Definitionen des Zeichens, sondern beschäftigt sich mit der *Semiose*, dem *Zeichenprozess*:

“But by ‘semiosis’ I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of *three* subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs.”


(Peirce CP 5.484)

“*Semiotics* is the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis.”

(Peirce CP 5.488)

Charles S. Peirce: *semiosis*


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Charles S. Peirce: *semiosis*

2-1


1 Zeichen / Repräsentamen



Charles S. Peirce: *semiosis*

2-2

2 Objekte



„Es gibt 1. das Unmittelbare Objekt, das das Objekt ist, wie das Zeichen selbst es repräsentiert, dessen Sein also von seiner Repräsentation im Zeichen abhängt, und es gibt 2. das Dynamische Objekt, das das Objekt selbst ist, unabhängig von irgendeiner Repräsentation [...]. Bei dem Unmittelbaren Objekt handelt es sich um das Objekt, das von Zeichen repräsentiert wird, bei dem Dynamischen Objekt handelt es sich um das Objekt, das das Zeichen erzeugt.“ (Oehler 1981: 24)

Charles S. Peirce — Object

“[T]his *requaesitum* I term the *object* of the sign:
— the immediate object if it be the idea which the sign is
built upon, the *real* object, if it be that real thing or
circumstance upon which that idea is founded as on bed-
rock.”

[Ms 318: Prag 40]

Charles S. Peirce — immediate object


“If there be anything *real* (that is, anything whose characters are true of it independently of whether you or I, or any man, or any number of men think them as being characters of it, or not), that sufficiently corresponds with the immediate object (which since it is an apprehension, is not real), then whether this be identifiable with the object strictly so-called or not, it ought to be called, and usually is called, the ‘real object’ of the sign.”

[Ms 318: Prag 41/42]

Charles S. Peirce: *semiosis*

2-3

3 Interpretanten




Hinsichtlich des Interpretanten ist zu unterscheiden zwischen 1. dem Unmittelbaren Interpretanten, d.i. dem Interpretanten, der sich im richtigen Verstehen des Zeichens zeigt, das heißt dem, was die Bedeutung des Zeichens genannt wird, 2. dem Dynamischen Interpretanten, d.i. die tatsächliche Wirkung, die von dem Zeichen ausgeht, die Reaktion, die ein Zeichen hervorruft, und 3. dem Finalen Interpretanten, d.i. die Wirkung, die das Zeichen in jedem Bewußtsein hervorrufen würde, wenn die Umstände es zuließen, daß das Zeichen seine volle Wirkung entfalten könnte.“ (Oehler 1981: 24-25)

Charles S. Peirce

Drei Korrelate der Semiose

Zeichen- oder
Mittelbezug



Objekt-
bezug Interpretanten-
bezug

Trichotomie im Objektbezug

- **Ikön**
- **Index** und
- **Symbol**

Charles S. Peirce: *Sign trichotomies*

“Signs are divisible by three trichotomies;

first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law;

secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign’s having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant;

thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.”

(Peirce CP 2.243)

Charles S. Peirce: Three Sign Trichotomies

Category applied	Correlates		
	Sign itself	Object	Interpretant
1. Possibility	Quali-Sign	Icon	Rheme (term)
2. Existence	Sin-Sign	Index	Dicent (sentence)
3. Law	Legi-Sign	Symbol	Argument

(Pape 1998: 2024)

Charles S. Peirce: Trichotomie/Objektbezug

Ikon

Similarität



Index

Kontiguität

pars pro toto

Kausalität



Symbol

Arbitrarität



Metaphern
Diagramme



„natürliche“
Zeichen (Rauch),
Metonyme



Sprache

Charles S. Peirce: Trichotomie/Objektbezug

Ikon

Ein *ikonisches Zeichen* repräsentiert sein Objekt "mainly by its similarity" (Peirce CP 2.276 & CP 2.247). Beispiele für *icons*: Bilder, Diagramm, Metaphern; Onomatopoeica.

Index

Das *indexikalische Zeichen* ist characterized by a direct relation (causal, contiguous, pars pro toto) between the object and the sign/representamen [cf. Peirce CP 2.299f.]. Beispiele: Rauch für Feuer (,natürliche' Zeichen), Fußspuren, Thermometer, Richtungspfeil; Präpositionen, Pronomen.

Symbol

Das Peircesche *Symbol* "is connected with its object by virtue of the idea of the symbol-using animal, without which no such connection would exist" (Peirce CP 2.299); rein arbiträr oder konventionell wie etwa Sprache: "All words, sentences, books and other conventional signs are symbols" [Peirce CP 2.292].



Peircean
Mousemiotics:

Icon



Peircean Mousemiotics:

Index

Peircean Mousemiotics:

Symbol



Charles S. Peirce — Second Trichotomy

“The second trichotomy gives us the way in which the categories may be applied to the second correlate in order to determine ‘the relation of the sign to its object’ (CP 2.243). If the relation between the sign and its object is only a **possibility**, we get an **Icon**, e.g., a **sample of blue** used to exemplify this color; if the relation holds between individuals and is therefore what Peirce calls an ‘**existential relation**’ (CP 6.318), we get an **Index**, e.g., the **height of quicksilver** in a thermometer as caused by the body temperature; if the relation is based on a **regularity** governing future interpretations or **conventions**, it is a **Symbol**, e.g., the convention to use the sequence of the letters **<r> <o> <t>** as the German word for *red*.”

(Pape 1998: 2025)

Charles S. Peirce: Trichotomie/Zeichenbezug

Die erste Trichotomie im Zeichenbezug :

“A sign is either of the nature of an appearance, when I call it a **qualisign** or secondly, it is an individual object or event, when I call it a **sinsign** (the syllable *sin* being the first syllable of *semel, simul, singular*, etc.); or thirdly, it is of the nature of a general type, when I call it a **legisign**. As we use the term ‘word’ in most cases, saying that ‘the’ is one ‘word’ and ‘an’ is a second ‘word’, a ‘word’ is a legisign. But when we say of a page in a book that it has 250 ‘words’ upon it, of which twenty are ‘the’s’, the ‘word’ is a sinsign. A sinsign so embodying a legisign, I term a ‘replica’ of the legisign. The difference between a legisign and a qualisign, neither of which is an individual thing, is that a legisign has a definite identity, though usually admitting a great variety of appearances. Thus, &, and, and the sound [of the printed ‘and’] are all one word. The qualisign, on the other hand, has no identity. It is the mere quality of an appearance and is not exactly the same throughout a second. Instead of identity, it has great similarity, and cannot differ much without being called another qualisign.”

(Peirce CP 8.334)

Charles S. Peirce — First Trichotomy

“In the first trichotomy the categories are applied to the sign vehicle to differentiate the possible properties of the material thing, process, or other entity which serves as a sign. As a **possibility** the sign is a quality or **Quali-Sign**, such as the quality **red**; as an existence it is an **individual entity** or **Sin-Sign**, like the first **or** in this sentence; as a law the sign itself is described as a **general type** of sign, a **Legi-Sign** that prescribes the properties of the tokens, such as the type of definite article **the** in the English language.”

(Pape 1998: 2025)

Charles S. Peirce: Trichotomie/Interpretantenbezug

Die dritte Trichotomie im Interpretantenbezug :

“A sign is either a **Rheme**, a **Dicent**, or an **Argument**. This corresponds to the old division, **Term**, **Proposition**, and **Argument**, modified so as to be applicable to signs generally. A *Term* is simply a class-name or proper-name [...]. A Rheme is any sign that is not true nor false [...]

A *proposition* as I use that term, is a dicent symbol. A dicent is not an assertion, but is a sign capable of being asserted. But an assertion is a dicent. According to my present view [...] the act of assertion is not a pure act of signification. It is an exhibition of the fact that one subjects oneself to the penalties visited on a liar if the proposition asserted is not true. An act of judgment is the self-recognition of a belief; and a belief consists in the deliberate acceptance of a proposition as a basis for conduct.”


(Peirce CP 8.337)

Charles S. Peirce — Third Trichotomy

“The third trichotomy gives us three ways in which categorial aspects differentiate interpretants. A sign is a **Rheme** or concept, if its interpretant takes it only as a **qualitative possibility** representing a kind of possible object, such as the general term *horse*, for which **every horse** is a possible object. If the interpretant takes its sign as a **signifying existence**, it is a **dicent** and affords **information** about its object. If the interpretant takes its sign as having a **lawlike character**, it is an **argument**; in this way every valid argument is based on a rule that allows one to **infer the conclusion from the premises.**”

(Pape 1998: 2025)

Charles S. Peirce: Sign trichotomies



(Theleffsen 2000/2001, <No10-A2.html>, <thirdness.gif>

Charles S. Peirce: *Kategorien, Trichotomien, Wissendisziplinen etc.*

Qualität

Ikons

Formale
Grammatik

Terme

Relation

Indizes

Logik

Proposi-
tionen

Repräsen-
tation

Symbole

Formale
Rhetorik

Schlüsse

Charles S. Peirce: 10 Hauptzeichenklassen 1

„Aus den möglichen Kombinationen der jeweils drei Subzeichen aus den drei Zeichenkorrelaten Repräsentamen (I), Objekt (II) und Interpretant (III [...]) ergeben sich die zehn Peirceschen Hauptzeichenklassen. [...]

In der folgenden Liste der zehn Hauptzeichenklassen mit Beispielen nach Peirce sind die für die jeweiligen Zeichenklasse redundanten bzw. voraus-zusetzenden Subzeichen eingeklammert:

- I. 1. (Rhematisch ikonisches) *Qualizeichen*, z. B. »ein Gefühl von ›rot««.
- II. 2. (Rhematisch) *ikonisches Sinzeichen*, z.B. »ein individuelles Diagramm«.
3. *Rhematisch indexikalisches Sinzeichen*, z.B. »ein spontaner Schrei«.
4. *Dicentisch* (indexikalisches) *Sinzeichen* oder auch *Spuren* (CP 8.341), z.B. »eine Wetterfahne«.
- III. 5. (Rhematisch) *ikonisches Legizeichen*, z.B. Eigennamen (CP 8.341) oder »ein Diagramm, unabhängig von seiner konkreten und individuellen Realisierung«.
6. *Rhematisch indexikalisches Legizeichen*, z.B. »ein Demonstrativpronomenj«.
7. *Dicentisch indexikalisches Legizeichen*, z.B. »der Ausruf eines Straßenhändlers«, Verkehrszeichen, ein imperativer Befehl oder ein Porträt mit einer Legende.
8. *Rhematisches Symbol* (und Legizeichen), z.B. »ein Gattungsname« (Substantiv).
9. *Dicentisches Symbol* (und Legizeichen), z.B. »eine gewöhnliche Proposition«.
10. *Argument* (und Symbol sowie Legizeichen), z.B. »ein Syllogismus«.“


(Nöth, Winfried (2000). *Handbuch der Semiotik*. 2. erw. Aufl. Stuttgart–Weimar: Metzler, 67)

Charles S. Peirce: 10 Classes of Signs

2

“Peirce creates ten classes of signs from the above trichotomies. The ten classes are a consequence of classes logically excluding each other. A Qualisign will always be a Rhematic Iconical Sign, and a Symbol will always be a Legisign, and an Argument will always be a Symbolic Legisign etc. The way Peirce’s ten basic classes of sign types are organized in figure 4 illustrates that two classes, which border on each other with a thin line, share similarities in two ways. For example, Indexical Sinsign (3, 4) or (1, 5) are both Iconic and Rhematic. But, where the thick black line divides the classes between 2 and 6, 6 and 9, 3 and 7, this is not the case. Neither can classes share similarities if they do not share borders. The classes have been given the shortest possible names that distinguish them from each other. The names of the classes are in bold letters.

In this way, Peirce manages to conceptualize ten basic different categories of sign types.”



(Theleffsen 2000/2001, <No10-A2.html>, <tensigntypes.gif>)

Charles S. Peirce: *Abduction*

1

“[T]here are but three elementary kinds of reasoning. The first, which I call **abduction** [...] consists in examining a mass of facts and in allowing these facts to suggest a theory. In this way we gain new ideas; but there is no force in the reasoning. [...] ... *induction* is, as Aristotle says, the inference of the truth of the major premiss of a syllogism of which the minor premiss is made to be true and the conclusion is found to be true, while abduction is the inference of the truth of the minor premiss of a syllogism of which the major premiss is selected as known already to be true while the conclusion is found to be true. **Abduction furnishes all our ideas concerning real things, beyond what are given in perception, but is mere conjecture, without probative force.**”

(*A Letter to Calderoni*, CP 8.209, c. 1905)

Charles S. Peirce: *Abduction*

2

“An **Abduction** is a method of forming a general prediction without any positive assurance that it will succeed either in the special case or usually, its justification being that it is the only possible hope of regulating our future conduct rationally, and that Induction from past experience gives us strong encouragement to hope that it will be successful in the future.”

(A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic, EP 2:299, 1903)

Charles S. Peirce: *Abduction*

3

“If we are to give the names of Deduction, Induction, and Abduction to the three grand classes of inference, then Deduction must include every attempt at mathematical demonstration, whether it relate to single occurrences or to “probabilities,” that is, to statistical ratios; Induction must mean the operation that induces an assent, with or without quantitative modification, to a proposition already put forward, this assent or modified assent being regarded as the provisional result of a method that must ultimately bring the truth to light; **while *Abduction* must cover all the operations by which theories and conceptions are engendered.**”

(*Lowell Lectures*, CP 5.590, 1903)

[weitere Zitate cf.: “Abduction”, in: *The Commens Dictionary of Peirce’s Terms. Peirce’s Terminology in His Own Words*. Virtual Centre for Peirce Studies at the University of Helsinki. <<http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/abduction.html>>]

Charles S. Peirce: *Abduction*

4


“In sum, then, with respect to the three forms of inference,
(1) *abduction* is the process whereby sensations become welded together ultimately to form a general idea,
(2) *induction* entails habit formation whereby sensations as they are related to similar events (reaction on the part of some other) are combined into a general idea, and
(3) *deduction* is the process by which a habit, as the result of abductive and inductive processes, becomes part of everyday conduct (CP: 6.144-46). It has become quite apparent that these processes tend to gravitate from vagueness to generality.”

(Merrell, Floyd. “Abducting the Process of Abducting: an Impossible Dream”. Web online: <<http://www.rz.uni-frankfurt.de/~wirth/texte/merell.htm>>; visited: 2003-05-02)

Charles S. Peirce: *Abduction*

5

“The following table summarizes the process of creating a work of art.”



(Everaert-Desmedt, Nicole (2006). “Peirce’s Esthetics”. In: Louis Hébert (dir.), *Signo* [on-line], Rimouski (Quebec). Web online: <http://www.signosemio.com/peirce/a_esthetique.asp>, <Peirce-schema.jpg> [visited: 2008-11-13])

Charles S. Peirce: *Abduktion*

1a

„1903 beschreibt Peirce die *Abduktion* als einen Prozeß, in dem wir eine »erklärende Hypothese aufstellen« und nennt sie »die einzige logische Operation, die zu einer neuen Idee führt« (CP 5.171). 1878 definiert Peirce Abduktion als ein neues Schlußverfahren, das im Gegensatz zur Induktion und Deduktion steht.

Eine *Deduktion* beweist, daß ein Sachverhalt notwendigerweise so ist. Wir gehen von einer allgemeinen Regel und einem beobachteten Einzelfall aus und folgern daraus ein weiteres Wissen über diesen Einzelfall. Peirce (CP 2.623) gibt folgendes Beispiel:

Regel: Alle Bohnen aus diesem Sack sind weiß.
Fall: Diese Bohnen sind aus diesem Sack.
Resultat (Folgerung): Diese Bohnen sind weiß.

Da der deduktive Schluß ein notwendiger ist, weil das Resultat bereits in der Regel enthalten ist, kann er nie zu einer neuen Erkenntnis führen.

Eine *Induktion* entsteht aus der Umkehrung einer Deduktion. Vom Einzelfall bzw. einer Vielzahl experimentell beobachteter Einzelfälle und einem verifizierten Resultat wird verallgemeinernd auf eine Regel geschlossen. Die induktiv gewonnene Erkenntnis ist aber letztlich immer nur eine Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussage:

Fall: Diese Bohnen sind aus diesem Sack.
Resultat: Diese Bohnen sind weiß.
Regel: Alle Bohnen aus diesem Sack sind weiß.

Charles S. Peirce: *Abduktion*

1b

Eine *Abduktion* schließt von einem erklärungsbedürftigen Resultat auf eine bisher unbekannte und nur probeweise angenommene (hypothetische) Regel, um einen Fall zu erklären:

Resultat:	Diese Bohnen sind weiß.
(Hyp.) Regel:	Alle Bohnen aus diesem Sack sind weiß.
Fall:	Diese Bohnen sind aus diesem Sack.

Aufgrund ihres bloßen hypothetischen Charakters ist eine solche Abduktion als wissenschaftliches Verfahren und in Verbindung mit den anderen Schlußverfahren einsetzbar, wenn es zu einer wahren Aussage führen soll (CP 2.270). Die Abduktion führt von Wahrnehmungsurteilen zunächst nur vorläufig zu einer allgemeinen Regel. Aus dieser abduktiven Regel müssen weitere allgemeine Sätze deduziert werden, und diese müssen danach noch induktiv überprüft werden (CP 2.776). Je mehr Beobachtungen einen induktiven Schluß auf die abduktiv postulierte Regel erlauben, desto mehr gewinnt diese an Erklärungspotential.“

(Nöth 2000: 67-68)